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Foucault, Marxism and the Cuban Revolution: Historical and Contemporary 
Reflections 
 
ABSTRACT: 
 
This article relates central themes of Marxist and Foucauldian thought to the 
intellectual and political legacy of the Cuban Revolution.  Against the backdrop 
of a reading of Foucault’s relationship to the revolutionary left, it is argued that 
Marxist theoretical discourse on guerrilla struggle (as articulated by Mao, 
Guevara and others) provide an intriguing case for bio-political struggle.  In the 
case of the Cuban revolution, an ethics of self-transformation appears in which 
new ways of living and practicing life are cultivated in opposition to 
sedimentations of state power.  Moreover, in addition to this historical case, a 
discussion is offered of the reception of Foucault’s work in contemporary Cuba, 
through an analysis of the published proceedings of a conference on Foucault 
held at the University of Havana in 1999.  Here, Foucault’s thought is 
appropriated as part of an effort to revitalize Cuban socialism itself.   
 
 
Key words: Cuba, Foucault, Revolution, Bio-Politics, Cuban Revolution, 
Marxism, Socialist Vanguards, Ethics of Self  
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Foucault, Marxism and the Cuban Revolution: Historical and Contemporary 
Reflections 
 
The guerrilla soldier should be an ascetic.  
-- Che Guevara (43)   
 
1. Introduction 
 
Perhaps one of the most productive dialogues within critical theory has 
occurred between the theoretical camps associated with Foucault and Marx’s 
radically differentiated approaches to questions of history, power and 
subjectivity. (Barrett 1991; Hunt 2004; Genel 2006)  Recent efforts to understand 
these differences and reconcile their respective visions have provided fertile 
intellectual terrain for those engaged with a culturalist rethinking of the Marxist 
tradition. (Goldstein 2004; Sakolsky 1992; Milchman & Rosenberg 2002)  In light 
of this, the aim of this essay is to extend this discussion, to broaden our 
understanding of the overlaps and antagonisms that define these theoretical 
fields and to tease out some complementarities that might define their combined 
use in the thinking through of contemporary issues of power, culture, 
subjectivity and social change.  Moreover, the encounter we envision is one 
which takes place not just on the terrain of competing Marxist and Foucauldian 
ideas, but in the way these ideas are seen to collide with empirical, unfolding 
historical events — specifically, the events surrounding the Cuban Revolution of 
1959.   
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The Revolution in Cuba, of course, is an event typically claimed and 
theorized by a Marxist tradition that evolved during the 20th century through 
Leninism and Maoism into a general theory of revolution. (Milios 1999)  Indeed, 
perhaps it is precisely the heavy presence of such Marxist thought that has 
insulated the Cuban revolution from a wider theoretical examination, and 
specifically dissuaded Foucault himself from any public comment on Cuba, even 
as events there transfixed other intellectuals on the left.  Yet by the same token, it 
is also because Marxist beliefs were being so aggressively put into practice in 
Cuba that the Cuban revolution presents itself as a promising historical case, an 
empirical meeting point, where Marxist and Foucauldian approaches might 
converge.  
Toward this end, we will seek links between socialist concepts of 
revolution and Foucault’s theorizations of “bio-power,” as the power, not to 
extinguish life, but to administer it — to animate life from within.  Twentieth 
century socialist revolutionary thought from Lenin to Guevara has argued the 
transformative significance of struggle itself, as an experience that fundamentally 
up-ends established (“bourgeois”) worldviews, developing new critical 
potentials and, we will argue, enabling new ways of life.  Similarly, formations of 
bio-power (as the power to condition life, to determine its specific form and 
direction, and to contain its possibilities), are vulnerable to challenges from 
below, in the form of bio-politics, wherein the terms of life itself are contested, its 
potentials reinvented, wrested from the ossifying institutions that contain it.  In 
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what follows, it will be argued that a tradition of socialist revolutionary practice 
can be read through the lens of bio-power, that the thoughts and actions of 
Cuban revolutionaries (even as such practices espouse the rhetoric of a certain 
Marxism), can be understood as bio-political strategies, aimed at the 
interrogation of and remobilization of life itself.  
But there is another purpose to which this study is directed.  This paper 
seeks to open up discussion with scholars practicing in Cuba, for whom the 
thought of Foucault is heralded as a potentially revitalizing force in the 
intellectual and political traditions that have followed from the Cuban revolution 
— a potential resource both for the renewal of Cuban socialism’s critique of 
capitalism, and for a critique of the highly sedimented and institutionalized 
forms to which the Cuban socialist project is currently consigned.  After offering 
our scenario for a Foucauldian encounter with the Cuban revolution, we will 
comment on the Cuban reception of Foucauldian thought, as contained in a 
volume titled Inicios de Partida (translated as “Initial Departures”), published in 
2000 by the Juan Marinello Center for Research and Development of Cuban 
Culture and the Antonio Gramsci Program at University of Havana.  The volume 
contains proceedings from the first and only public conference in Cuba on the 
work of Foucault.   
 
2. The Ethics of Revolution: Foucault in Cuba 
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At various moments in his life, Foucault sought philosophical meaning in 
the struggles of radical movements and revolutionary experiences, often for 
reasons that far outstripped the explicit ideological premises of these movements 
themselves.  In Iran, Poland, Tunisia and in his work with the French prison 
movement, Foucault aligned himself with insurgent or reformist groups, lending 
critical firepower to their causes while gathering lessons and experiences that 
would feed back into his overall thought. (Eribon 1991: 281-295)  But Foucault 
never visited Cuba, nor did he offer (to our knowledge) more than a passing 
reference to it in his comments and writings.  The reasons for this lack of 
engagement are no doubt symptomatic of his deeply ambivalent relationship 
with Marxism and the left, expressed in his deep seated antipathy to the French 
Communist Party and what he described in an interview with the Italian Marxist 
Duccio Trombadori (later published as Remarks on Marx) as the “hyper-Marxism” 
of the student movements of 1968. (Foucault 1991: 138)  Such left political 
vanguards, Foucault charged, assumed a mediating authority in the 
revolutionary process, which masked their role in the reproduction of juridical 
norms and ultimately the reinstitutionalization of power relations. (Foucault 
1980)  This does not mean that Foucault saw no value in revolutionary processes 
themselves: Foucault, the revolutionary, preferred the “absolutely collective will” 
he observed in the mass uprisings in Tehran, whose mobilizations were without 
revolutionary parties and militant factions in any conventional sense of the term. 
(Afaray & Anderson 2005: 253)   
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Indeed, it is possible to imagine that a Foucauldian reading of the Cuban 
revolution might follow a similar path to the one he took in Iran, centering on the 
modes of subjectivity and practices of radical self fashioning enabled in the 
revolutionary process.  Such revolutionary movements, for Foucault, proposed a 
radical subjective transformation defined by an intensity and inventiveness 
resulting from both a confrontation with dominant structures of power and 
profound individual encounter with sedimented, everyday modes of existence.  
As Foucault describes it, revolutions bring about personal change by grasping 
“mobile and transitory points of resistance, producing cleavages in a society that 
shifts about, fracturing unities and affecting regroupings, furrowing across 
individuals themselves, cutting them up and remolding them, marking off 
irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and minds” (Foucault 1978: 96).   
Moreover, these revolutionary transformations, at their most heated 
intensities, were actualized through a willingness to contest the boundaries of 
“life,” as a political deployment, through the risk death — a threshold which 
renewed personal authenticity through an encounter with the limits of bio-
power.  Death, as a limit to power that holds the potential for a renewal of 
experience and selfhood, was central to Foucault’s comments on the Iranian 
revolution — a theme which runs to the heart of many revolutionary narratives 
of personal and social transformation, wherein vanguards develop into cults of 
martyrdom as they risk death in pursuit of political goals.   
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Yet any effort to tie together Foucault’s thesis on bio-political struggle 
with a socialist revolutionary program must first reconcile Foucault’s specific 
distaste for Marxist revolutionary politics itself.  This is made clear in his 
discussion with a group of French Maoists, published in Les Temps Modernes as 
“On Popular Justice.”  To the proposal from Maoist militants that a people’s 
court be established in France to judge the French police, Foucault expressed 
ambivalence, asserting that the court as an instrument of popular justice 
functions instead to retard the process of what might be considered an act of 
popular justice itself, “re-inscribing it within institutions which are typical of a 
state apparatus” (Foucault 1980: 1).   
Foucault goes on to extend this critique to the radical fraction advocated 
most vehemently by the Maoists for the purpose of revolutionary struggle: the 
People’s Red Army.  The Red Army represented a vanguard group, disciplined 
and organized, whose function it was to reign in the revolutionary energies of 
the masses — whose opposition to domination would otherwise remain 
dispersed and unconcentrated — under a provisional state apparatus capable of 
facilitating a transition to communism through an intermediary stage, a 
“dictatorship of the proletariat.”  The Red Army were necessary in order that 
“there be some legal authority so that the diverse acts of vengeance should be in 
conformity with law, with a people’s law.” (Foucault 1980: 2)  Foucault, however, 
is explicit in his opposition to the interventions of such third parties in the direct 
expression of an act of popular, revolutionary justice, as actions that are “not 
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backed up by a state apparatus which has the power to enforce their decisions, 
they purely and simply carry them out.” (Foucault 1980: 9)  Such a conception of 
popular justice as an unmediated act of retribution between dominant and 
oppressed groups runs directly against the role of the revolutionary vanguard, 
whose significance is first theorized by Lenin, and later by others constituting the 
socialist revolutionary canon from Mao to Guevara and Võ Nguyên Giáp, 
commander of the People’s Army of Vietnam. 
However, we should not conclude from this that Foucault was 
uninterested in socialist vanguard groups per se, or that he saw no value in their 
efforts.  Indeed, Foucault was at times effusive about the revolutionary process 
itself as one with rich ethical implications, as evidenced in his comments on the 
student movement he witnessed in 1968 in Tunisia, where he taught philosophy 
at the University of Tunis.  During his stay of almost two years, Foucault became 
aligned with a mobilization of leftist students whose increasing radicalism came 
to a boil with the events of the Six Day War in 1967.  Combining pan-Arabism 
with Trotskyite and Maoist sentiments, these students impressed upon Foucault 
the depth and conviction of their revolutionary purpose. (Eribon: 187-198).  But 
more than anything else, it was the intensity of their devotion to their purpose, to 
the point of risking death, that drew him in.  Foucault praised the “possibility of 
an absolute sacrifice” that he observed, which reflected the “existential, I should 
say physical, commitment” of the students willing to risk their lives. (Foucault 
1991:136-7) 
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These themes were to come to the fore of Foucault’s thinking on 
revolutionary movements ten years later, in his coverage of the Iranian 
revolution.  In journalistic reports he expressed his enthusiasm for the broad 
mass of participants in the revolutionary effort who, like the Tunisian students, 
seemed to operate without the direction of a political vanguard of any sort, 
responding directly, physically and with their own lives to the concrete 
conditions of oppression they experienced on a daily basis.  Indeed, for Foucault, 
the uprisings in Iran signified a political will, which was at once a political 
spirituality — one that sought as its target the entire texture of modern life, and 
with it a transformation of subjectivity as such.   
In rising up the Iranians said to themselves — and this is perhaps the soul 
of the uprising: ‘Of course, we have to change this regime… But, above all, 
we have to change ourselves.  Our way of being, our relationship with 
others, with things, with eternity, with God etc., must be completely 
changed, and there will only be a true revolution if this radical change in 
our experience takes place…’ there was the desire to renew their entire 
existence by going back to a spiritual experience that they thought they 
could find within Shi’ite Islam itself.  (Foucault 2005: 255)  
 
The insights Foucault drew from this encounter hold potential for a richer 
understanding of the dynamics of revolutionary movements generally, and for a 
better understanding of their implications for a politics of life.  As we shall see, 
socialist vanguards of the sort that drove the Cuban revolution to such heights 
contained powerful visions of transformed ways of life, and of the challenge to 
“renew one’s entire existence.”   
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3. The Renewal of Life in the Cuban Revolution 
Such a political mobilization of life forces and a radical will to interrogate 
and reinvent subjective modes of existence (even at the risk of revolutionary 
martyrdom), is most readily apparent among those core members of the guerrilla 
army who later fill the offices of state — figures who ultimately project 
themselves and their experiences of transformation as exemplary of the modes of 
citizenship in new socialist society.  These figures composed the vanguard of the 
revolutionary movement, typified in the character of the Castro brothers, Che 
Guevara, Camilo Cienfuegos, and others claiming normative authority over the 
direction of revolutionary change, and the right to shape and discipline its form 
according the precepts of socialist theory.   
While Foucault’s criticism of such normative vanguards (and of the 
oppressive state institutions they established) was relentless, it is nonetheless 
possible to read the significance of this vanguard group against the grain of their 
own legitimizing discourse, to inquire into the forms of resistance they mobilized 
and the new forms of life they made possible.  This potential can be grasped 
when read against the backdrop of a tradition of Marxist-Leninist thought on the 
role of political vanguards in facilitating a general revolutionary transformation 
of society.  This is not to suggest any internal agreement between Foucauldian 
theory and revolutionary socialist theory: it is to suggest that the latter be viewed 
through the lens of the former, that socialist revolutionary thought and practice 
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be considered for the ways in which it functioned discursively and actually, and 
for the fields of life it mobilized and the modes of existence it proposed.   
This tradition begins with the Marxist-Leninist framing of the role of the 
vanguard in the revolutionary process.  In the pages of What is to be Done?, Lenin 
spelled out the limitations that beset workers parties in their efforts to operate 
beyond the narrow aims of trade unionism, and the need for political vanguards, 
that is, small circles of intellectuals possessing a unique revolutionary 
consciousness. (Lenin 1961)  Lenin famously advocated for the disciplined 
control of a vanguardist circle, whose aim was not only to mobilize radical forces 
and direct them toward the destabilization of the state, but to educate the 
masses, and to affect changes in their own consciousness, stripping away 
moribund bourgeois ideologies not only among their ranks but ultimately among 
the proletariat and the population at large.   
This thread was taken up by Mao in his statements on the “people’s war” 
which provided a set of revolutionary strategies adapted for the conditions of a 
pre-industrial population, concentrating on the mobilization of peasant forces by 
a guerrilla vanguard through a series of hit-and-run tactics conducted in the 
countryside against a centralized, regular army (Tse Tung 1961).  For this reason, 
guerrillas, since they could not be mobilized, directed or controlled through a 
centralized party structure, had to bear within themselves a powerful ideological 
investment and an intense relation of self-control and self-discipline.  This way of 
life was modeled in many ways on conventional techniques of military 
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discipline, although discipline itself was adapted, appropriated, and 
reconfigured in ways far surpassing the instrumental aims of military regulation 
to affect a more profound transformation in subjectivity and personal existence.  
Specifically, the conduct of a people’s war enacted two radical breaks from 
traditional regimes of military discipline: first, victory was to be achieved 
through a struggle that was protracted and extensive (a way of life) allowing 
guerrilla forces to disseminate their influence through the gradual infiltration of 
the popular social fabric, and, simultaneously, the slow erosion of the will of the 
government forces.  Guerrilla struggle was, in this way, fundamentally distinct 
from the heroism typically attached to military operations because it was waged 
through a sustained and autonomous practice, adopted, improvised and 
mobilized against the enemy by a guerrilla fighter whose battle was both internal 
and external (Tse Tung 2000).   
Second, the guerrillas of the people’s war were to become deft magicians 
in the arts of tactical conflict, improvising from scratch, on the basis of extensive 
knowledge of the environment, ways of fighting that the trained and highly 
centralized forces of the regular army could not anticipate.  A way of life, a 
technique of selfhood and a method of warfare were, in this regard, integrated in 
a mutually constituting totality in which the cultivation of new vitalities and new 
forces within the self was undertaken in ways that far surpassed the disciplinary 
techniques of traditional military training in their inventiveness and intensity.  In 
other words, the bio-political regulation of military life was transformed in the 
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hands of the people’s army — a process which combined personal 
transformation with the willed encounter with death.  And guerrilla struggle was 
itself an experience of subjective renewal: the guerrillas, recruited from the urban 
ranks of radical intellectuals were to become skilled operators in rural 
environments, acquainting themselves with local ways of life in these regional 
contexts, and drawing from stocks of local knowledge to devise their battle 
tactics.  Indeed, fostering bonds with peasants was part of a process of 
ideological development to which guerrillas were required to submit themselves 
in order that they evolve the conviction and proper ethical form demanded of 
revolutionary struggle, but also to gain the moral and political orientation 
demanded of them after they assumed positions of power in the new 
government.   
Guerrillas, revolutionaries in agrarian societies, were urban instruments of 
the peasant classes, transformed by their experiences in rural areas and their 
deep immersion in the lives of peasant workers — in the rhythms of their days, 
in the patterns of their habits and leisure, and in their specific modes of life.  In 
other words, Mao’s view of the political vanguard as a guerrilla insurgency 
propelling a people’s war was characterized not just by its strategies of political 
mobilization, but by the mobilization of a special kind of ethical type, a 
practitioner of a new form of life who lives among the peasants, in Mao’s famous 
phrase, “as a fish moves through water,” drawing sustenance and life from them 
for the purposes of struggle, but also transforming himself in the course.   
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The Cuban revolution, which did not begin as a socialist movement, 
retained deep strains of nationalist sentiment which, together with its operational 
base in the countryside mandated a powerful linkage between the guerrilla 
soldier, the rural landscape, and the agrarian economic network itself.  Indeed, 
the July 26 Movement that propelled Castro and his guerrilla force to power in 
1959 related a powerful narrative of its own techniques of struggle, which 
included a rich mythology of the guerrilla type as an ethical tactician, one 
possessing an array of tricks and skills for use in daily life in tactical ways, but 
also a deep ethical disposition capable of heroic feats of self sacrifice, of rich 
empathic bonds with peasants and other members of oppressed fractions, and of 
deep selflessness and solidarity in the struggles of everyday existence, even (and 
especially) in the face of death.  Such ethical predispositions, incubated in the 
guerrilla encampments in the Sierra Maestra mountains, and in the hit-and-run 
campaign against Batista’s superior military forces, spelled out a new kind of 
revolutionary self and ultimately a renewed form of life.  What Guevara would 
describe as the “socialist man in Cuba” was one that underwent a significant 
transformation in the way he understood and practiced his own life, partly as a 
fact of historical destiny and partly through a self-imposed program of ethical 
self-work (Guevara 2005).  This new man was cultivated in struggle, later 
refashioned for the purposes of revolutionary government, and finally 
generalized and exported broadly to the wider population as the proper form for 
an invigorated Cuban citizenry in which every citizen was herself a 
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revolutionary in myriad everyday practices, choices and behaviors.  In Guevara’s 
words: 
The guerrilla fighter, as a person conscious of a role in the vanguard of the 
people, must have a moral conduct that shows him to be a true priest of 
the reform to which he aspires.  To the stoicism imposed by the difficult 
conditions of warfare should be added an austerity born of rigid self-
control that will prevent a single excess, a single slip, whatever the 
circumstances.  The guerrilla soldier should be an ascetic. (Guevara, 1961: 
43) 
 
Indeed, Guevara theorized the development of the inner life of the 
revolutionary as a process of personal transformation, which was at once a 
practice of intentional self-development and self-work, albeit one directed at 
times by members of the vanguard group, for whom the change is already more 
concretely realized.  In Cuban revolutionary discourse, this project was defined 
in terms of the spirit for collective, cooperative work undertaken by the 
individual — a capacity which had to be worked on, shaped and developed in 
specific ways.  Guevara writes: 
I think the place to start is to recognize the individual's quality of 
incompleteness, of being an unfinished product. The vestiges of the past 
are brought into the present in one's consciousness, and a continual labor 
is necessary to eradicate them.  The process is two-sided. On the one hand, 
society acts through direct and indirect education; on the other, the 
individual submits to a conscious process of self-education. (Guevara, 
2005: 203) 
 
For the Cuban revolutionary, such continual labor was contingent upon 
the active contributions of the individual, in her work on society and on herself.  
“In this period of the building of socialism” Guevara writes, “we can see the new 
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man and woman being born.”  Indeed, the socialist state is so invested in the 
development and dissemination of such a mode of livelihood as to compare itself 
to a large scale educational enterprise: “Society as a whole must be converted 
into a gigantic school.”  
Education takes hold among the masses and the foreseen new attitude 
tends to become a habit. The masses continue to make it their own and to 
influence those who have not yet educated themselves. This is the indirect 
form of educating the masses, as powerful as the other, structured, one 
(Guevara, 2005: 206)  
 
This proposal for a Foucauldian reading of the role of the vanguard 
revolutionary party as tacticians in the bio-political struggle (speculative and 
partial as it is), allows us to consider the relationship between certain 
Foucauldian and Marxian themes, in the light of a specific historical event.  
However, to advance this aim, let us now turn from Cuba’s history to 
contemporary Cuban scholarship on Foucault, and to the relation of Foucault to 
existing Cuban socialist thought.   
 
4. Foucault and Marxism: A Cuban Synthesis? 
 
How has Foucault’s legacy been received in Cuba?  Our reflection on the 
Cuban reception of Foucault is admittedly non-comprehensive and partial, 
focusing as it does on one document — the edited proceedings from a conference 
held in September 1999 at the University of Havana, published the following 
year as Inicios de Partida or “Initial Departures.”  In the collection’s introduction, 
some light is shed on the limited and constraining conditions under which 
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Cuban scholars began to read Foucault: “it was very difficult to get a hold of any 
work by Foucault in Cuba… until the first part of the 1980s,” when Foucault’s 
works began to be read with “certain systematization,” but “almost 
clandestinely, at the margins of institutional programs” (Inicios de Partida 
2000:37).  Indeed, the conference organizers admit that “there are no Foucault 
specialists in Cuba,” only a few scholars “who deal with Foucault’s work” 
(Inicios de Partida 2000:131), as such a specialization would require a familiarity 
with the French intellectual atmosphere of the postwar milieu that Cuban 
scholars, largely isolated from academic exchanges with Western universities 
since the 1960’s, do not possess.  Yet through informal channels, the editors tell 
us, Foucault’s works began to circulate.  Some of the Cuban scholars recount 
getting a hold of some "wrinkled photocopies” of Foucault’s texts “that went 
from hand to hand and began to circulate among professors and advanced 
students at the Instituto Superior de Arte, at that time a sort of theoretical 
vanguard in Havana, and in the Schools of Arts and Literature, and of 
Philosophy and History at University of Havana” (Inicios de Partida 2000: 36-37) 
1  
In this regard, the Cuban reception of Foucault has been both constrained 
and scattershot: largely developed outside of (and at times against) the academic 
mainstream in that country.  However, there is a significant thread woven 
through the proceedings from the 1999 conference, which coalesces on an 
expression of hope, shared by all of the participants, that an engagement with the 
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work of Foucault might help to integrate the Cuban academic scene into a global 
dialogue on the left, to end its isolation and to repair the reputation once held by 
the University of Havana in such dialogues, “which has a much diminished role 
from the one it had forty, fifty, or even sixty years ago” (Inicios de Partida 
2000:220)  Participants in the conference were largely faculty in the Department 
of Philosophy at the University of Havana, where Marxian theories predominate.  
Indeed, the book’s introduction puts forth the aims of the conference: "our 
interest in Foucault does not represent a way of drifting away from Marxism,” 
state the organizers; in fact " the thinking of Marx and Foucault share many 
things, but one is central: both are thoughts for combat, polemic thoughts."  
Thus, even as the essays are described as “initial departures,” they nonetheless 
share a common aim: to "appropriate the critical and revolutionary aspects of 
Foucault’s thinking,” and to rescue the “subversive,” “revolutionary” Foucault 
“from the deformations that his work has undergone from the right and the 
dilettantes, and put it in service of the revolutionary Marxist left” (Inicios de 
Partida 2000: 6-7).    
Toward this end, the organization of the published proceedings echoes the 
format of the conference: two panels are separated by a keynote address, the first 
of which is “The Challenge of Historiography: Archaeology and Genealogy,” 
and the second “Reason, Subject, Humanism: What is to be Critiqued?,” with a 
keynote speech by Jorge Luis Acanda Gonzalez entitled "From Marx to Foucault: 
Power and Revolution.”  Of the six papers included on these panels, most reflect 
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topics not unfamiliar to Foucault scholars in the West, although they are 
presented here with an aim and an urgency that stems directly from the Cuban 
predicament.  Among them are Maria del Pilar Diaz Castañón’s “Foucault and 
the Chimera of Origin" which examines the "subversive" Foucault who “rejects 
the classical premises of the history of ideas”; Lohania Aruca’s "Reflections on 
the Foucault effect and the History of Cuba" describes the radical potential of 
Foucault’s genealogical method and his concept of “subjugated knowledges,” 
and Paul Ravelo’s “Michel Foucault: Descentered Epistemology and 
Psychoanalysis of Modern Subjectivity,” which brings together psychoanalytic 
theory with Foucault’s genealogy of the subject.   
Among these varied contributions are reflected several currents which, at 
first blush, share no clear consensus on Foucault’s relevance to Cuban socialism.  
Yet, it seems clear that two general concerns color the arguments put forward.  
First is the desire to update the Marxism that has shaped Cuban socialism with a 
more developed cultural receptiveness, not unlike the “cultural turn” that 
reshaped various Western Marxisms in the latter third of the 20th century, or 
perhaps with a nod to the vision of a “socialism with a human face” that 
anticipated the events of the Prague Spring in 1968.  In this collection, this 
program is largely pursued through a rethinking of the work of Antonio Gramsci 
along specifically Foucauldian lines, in an effort to coax Marxism away from 
explicit economic determinism, and the highly institutionalized state forms to 
which such theories have consigned much socialist revolutionary thought and 
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practice, toward a greater attention to everyday life practices as the sites of 
resistances, interventions and opposition. (Laclau & Mouffe 1989)  A second 
concern is found in the more explicit undertaking aimed at a theorization of 
revolutionary praxis as an active vital practice of social and subjective (a theme 
developed in the first part of this essay), capable of mobilizing new modes of 
subjectivity against the institutionalized and petrified forms of power 
institutionalized in the Cuban socialist state.  We will discuss these two 
tendencies in turn.   
Authors included in Inicios de Partida strain to link the revolutionary 
contributions of Foucault with Marxist thought.  As a support for this assertion, 
several authors make reference to Foucault’s phrase: “Frequently I summon 
phrases, concepts, texts from Marx, but without feeling obliged to give the small 
identifying piece that goes with a citation from Marx… I summon Marx without 
saying I am, without putting him between inverted commas.” (Inicios de Partida 
2000:14; Foucault 1978:100)  Yet such a rescuing of the radical Foucault entails, 
among other things, an interrogation of the limits of Marxian theories, most 
apparently in an expansion of the empirical domain in which power relations are 
perceived to take place, from the institutions of state and civil society to multiple 
sites which extend to the body and everyday life.  In this regard, Foucault’s ideas 
are seen as working against the codification of revolutionary impulses and the 
petrification of social power to which Marxian theories and their attendant state 
institutions have, in the Cuban context, largely fallen prey.   
- 20 - 
Toward this end, Marial Iglesias calls for a “political economy of the 
body,” drawing on what is perceived to be a new conception of power developed 
by Foucault as a strategic and relational form, whose effects of domination go 
beyond those traditional places in which power is studied in Cuba: state 
institutions, repressive apparatuses, justice courts and so on, and extend it to 
inscriptions of power on everyday practices, “a fine network of relations, always 
tense and changing, that permeate each aspect of social life, even in the most 
intimate corners of life, such as the body and sexuality" (Inicios de Partida 
2000:34).  Similarly, such an extension of the domain of the political is seized by 
other authors for its critical potential: Foucault’s emphasis on subjugated 
knowledges, one author writes, “allows people to learn to think and question 
things that are generally considered unquestionable,” thus holding great 
potential in refocusing Cuban revolutionary efforts towards the transformation 
of everyday practice: “the everyday existence of common people, the world of 
material objects around them, and the diverse forms of perceiving and imagining 
their world” (Inicios de Partida 2000:35).  A Marxism that is dislodged from 
economic determinist models, in which the nuances of culture are interpreted as 
sites both of domination and resistance, parallels efforts in Western Marxism to 
expand Marxist categories to address daily life more generally, and to affect a de-
regidification of socialist institutions, from vanguard parties to state apparatuses.   
Indeed, while this discussion of Foucault’s work strains to remain within a 
clearly recognizable Marxist framework, many authors, while only implicitly or 
- 21 - 
between the lines, agree with Foucault’s rejection of the Marxism of parties as 
“that sclerotic, reformist, and bureaucratized left which had reduced the complex 
and critical Marxist discourse into a group of empty formulas and slogans.”  
They understand that a socialist renovation fashioned on the original Cuban 
revolutionary spirit requires a new attention to everyday practices, and to the 
special kinds of ethical life and practices of self-formation that are not present in 
today’s ossified Cuban society.  In this sense, the Cuban incorporation of 
Foucault into a socialist framework comprises the alignment of his work, and 
even his own position as an intellectual, with the working class and other 
subjugated groups and against the bourgeoisie.  This effort embraces the 
possibility of intellectuals or experts enhancing and transforming the lives of 
others, and working against the solidification of power. 
Indeed, the thrust of this effort reflects trends within Western Marxism 
toward a cultural rethinking of economic deterministic models, and toward a 
broader definition of social life.  As in Western Marxism, a significant stage in 
this shift comes with the work of Antonio Gramsci — a figure with whom 
Cubans are well familiar.  By and large, Cuban scholars consider Gramsci’s 
understanding of power as hegemony as inaugurating a new perspective on the 
reflection of everyday practices of subject-formation, even though they also 
recognize that his new “challenge to Marxist intellectuals regarding how 
hegemony was exercised was not taken seriously by the theoretical apparatuses 
of the institutionalized Marxist movement” (Inicios de Partida 2000: 89).   
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Foucault, just as Gramsci did decades before, alerts us of the diffuse 
character of the networks of relations that produce domination.  For both 
Foucault and Gramsci, power is not “something imposed from above, instead it 
is something that is produced and reproduced in the interstices of everyday 
life.”2  Or as Acanda puts it, “it is not a straitjacket imposed upon society to 
regulate what it produces; from the start society and power interact producing 
one another,” and thus “the construction of subjectivity is not a free, spontaneous 
process” (Inicios de Partida 2000: 91).  Indeed, another fruitful similarity is that 
Gramci’s notion of the formation of hegemony and common sense can be 
connected to Foucault’s “politics of truth” and to his idea that different types of 
revolution can occur because: 
[T]he state consists of the codification of a number of power relations that 
make possible its functioning . . . Revolution means a different type of 
recodification of the same relations.  This implies that there are very 
different classes of revolution.  There are as many types as there are 
possible recodifications of the power relations, and one can perfectly 
conceive revolutions that leave essentially untouched the relations of 
power that form the bases of the functioning of the state" (Inicios de 
Partida 2000: 94; Foucault 1980:122-123).  
 
This notion has the potential — and the Cuban scholars are aware of this 
— to expand into a critique of practices and processes that, while revolutionary 
in name, serve to de-mobilize the revolutionary project itself.  This leads directly 
to a critique of the trajectory of the Cuban revolution from its auspicious 
beginnings in the early 1960s to the cumbersome administrative form it currently 
inhabits, and give a new meaning to the notion that revolution is the renewal of 
life.  Foucault’s revealing of the essence of the “politics of truth” of the capitalist 
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system as the basis upon which its dominance survives, allows the Cubans to 
reflect upon the possibility of eliminating capitalist domination, which “implies 
the radical subversion of its ‘politics of truth,’ and the creation of another 
essentially different one” (Inicios de Partida 2000: 92)  Or as Acanda puts it, “the 
question is not getting rid of power altogether (a chimera, since truth is power),” 
but to “separate power from truth in the social, economic, and cultural forms that 
come together to constitute hegemony.” Here again Acanda connects Gramsci’s 
concept of hegemony with Foucault’s assertion that "the problem is not to change 
the conscience of the people but the political, economic, institutional regime of 
the production of truth” (Inicios de Partida 2000: 93; Foucault 1980:133).  
In short, there is a tendency within these works to bring together elements 
from Gramsci and his concept of “hegemony” with Foucauldian concepts of the 
“politics of truth” — a linkage that, the Cubans believe, can help establish a new 
basis for the creation of truly revolutionary subjectivities.  Indeed, the Cuban 
scholars in Inicios de Partida believe that the Gramci-Foucault connection will 
create a fresh critique not just of state socialist institutions where self-forming 
capacities of revolutionary praxis are codified and arrested, but of global forms 
of capitalist domination.  Acanda even talks of a Gramscian-Foucauldian 
synthesis that “will enhance our understanding of the significance of the 
popular, collective, and democratic exercise of micro-powers; the 
decentralization and socialization of power; and the need to reconstruct 
identities in accordance with a new liberating and de-alienating process which 
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implies the development of a new and imaginative theory for the construction of 
a pluricentric and truly democratic socialism, one in the purest tradition of our 
revolution” (Inicios de Partida 2000: 112-113).  Indeed, it is with Acanda that we 
find the most explicit expression of the second theme mentioned earlier: a 
specifically Cuban appropriation of Foucauldian themes for a renewal of the 
transformative potential of revolutionary praxis.   
There is no question that the statement that engages most forcefully in 
Inicios de Partida is that of the keynote address, given by Jorge Acanda, which is 
notable for its vision of a radical politics of everyday transformations linking 
Cuban socialism with Foucault.  For Acanda, Foucault’s critique of capitalist 
society from its implicit linkage of formations of knowledge/power is relevant to 
a tradition of social theory framed by the Cuban revolutionary experience.  Such 
a critique is not limited to a reflection on power in the abstract sense, but selects 
as its purpose the aim to “reveal the essential political/rational elements in 
modern capitalist society, and underline its effects over the processes of subject-
formation in individuals as a first step toward the construction of strategic 
knowledge.”  In fact, he argues that Foucault's understanding of the base on 
which political rationality stands can work against the incorporation of the 
transformative force of revolutionary change (what we earlier described as the 
bio-political strategies of the Cuban revolution) into the dominant structures of 
power, or, as he puts it, to limit the process by which “new forms, spaces and 
agents of the revolution end up being assimilated and neutralized by the same 
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power that they are struggling against.” This focus on the power struggle over 
the definition of everyday life has great potential to regenerate Marxism in Cuba, 
Acanda argues, because Marxism is a theoretical canon that has “not developed 
adequate conceptual structures to analyze these struggles and their outcomes” 
(Inicios de Partida 2000:87).  Because Foucault asserted that disciplinary societies 
perpetuate themselves through power relations that exert their influence on all 
the social body, and expose the nexus between forms of knowledge, disciplinary 
techniques, and economic relations, his theory, according to Acanda, “should be 
appropriated by the revolution” since “it allows for a necessary critique, from the 
revolutionary left, of the dogmatic and economistic Marxism, because the 
positivist and instrumental conception of Marxism simply changed the people 
working in state structures but in many cases kept the vertical, repressive, 
authoritarian functioning logic of those structures”(Inicios de Partida 2000: 88), 
thus blocking the emergence of new forms of life defined by a creative 
confrontation with both dominant power structures and everyday modes of 
existence.  
In short, for Acanda, as for the other Cuban scholars in Inicios de Partida, 
Foucault’s explorations of self-work and self-transformation through the 
“essential character of ‘micro-powers’ constitutes an inescapable theoretical base 
for the further development of Marxist political theory” (Inicios de Partida 
2000:90).  Further, Foucault’s work reveals that power mechanisms have their 
own dynamics, “and if we don’t try to construct another type of power, one that 
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avoids domination, exploitation, subordination and asymmetry, then the 
liberating essence of the [Cuban] revolution will disappear.”  Here Acanda is 
again underlining the importance of Foucault’s work for those interested in the 
renewal of the Cuban revolution by creating a situation where a different, non-
dominating, type of power prevails: “a critical and rational regime of truth 
capable of producing the free development and creation of subjectivities” (Inicios 
de Partida 2000:110-111). This implies a transformation of subjectivity as much as 
a change in institutionalized political forms.   
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
A Foucauldian insight into the dynamics of the Cuban revolution, one 
fashioned speculatively from the history of Foucault’s encounters with radical 
movements, and one drawn from ongoing debates among Cuban Foucault 
scholars, has many elements to forge an opening for a wider dialogue on 
Foucault and Cuban revolutionary social thought.  We have sought, in the 
preceding pages, to accomplish to provoke a critical encounter between 
Foucaudian and Marxian thought around the events of the Cuban revolution.  
Our aim was twofold: first, to enable a rethinking of the role of revolutionary 
vanguards through the concept of bio-power and bio-politics; and second to link 
these insights with current debates within Cuban intellectual discourse on the 
potential for Foucault’s thought to reinvigorate Cuban socialism in the context of 
its current predicament.  In either case, we have chosen to highlight those 
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features of Foucault’s work that concentrate on the transformative powers of 
revolution, which serve to open new thresholds for the reconfiguration of 
subjectivity in new practices of life.   
 
References 
 
Afaray, Janet & Kevin Anderson eds. (2005) Foucault and the Iranian 
Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.  
Barrett, Michelle (1991) The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault 
Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Eribon, Didier (1991) Michel Foucault trans. Betsy Wing. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press.  
Foucault, Michel (1978) Microfisica del Poder. Madrid. Ediciones La Piqueta. 
______________ (1980) “On Popular Justice: A Discussion with Maoists” 
trans. John Mepham, in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1972-1977. ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon.  
______________ (1978) Introduction: Volume I of the History of Sexuality. 
Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Random House.  
______________ (1991) Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio 
Trombadori. New York: Semiotext(e).  
______________ (2003) Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de 
France, 1975-76. New York: St. Martin's Press  
______________ (2005) “Iran: The Spirit of a World Without Spirit” in 
Afary, Janet and Kevin B. Anderson (eds) Foucault and the Iranian 
Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Genel, Katia (2006) “The Question of Biopower: Foucault and Agamben” 
Rethinking Marxism, 18 (1): 43-62. 
- 28 - 
Goldstein, Philip (2004) “Between Althusserian Science and Foucauldian 
Materialism: The Later Work of Pierre Macherey” Rethinking 
Marxism, 16 (3): 327-337.  
Guevara, Che (2005) “Socialist Man in Cuba” The Che Reader, (ed. David 
Deutschmann) Melbourne, Australia: Ocean Press.  
______________ (1961) Che Guevara on Guerrilla Warfare New York: 
Praeger. 
Alan Hunt (2004)  “Getting Marx and Foucault into Bed Together!” Journal 
of Law and Society 31 (4), 592–609. 
Inicios de Partida. Coloquio sobre la obra de Foucault. Centro de Investigación 
y Desarrollo de Cultura Cubana Juan Marinello. Catedra de 
Estudios Antonio Gramsci. La Habana, Cuba, 2000. 
Laclau, Ernesto & Chantalle Mouffe (1989) Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: 
Toward a Radical Democratic Politics New York: Verso.  
Lenin, Vladimir (1961) Lenin: Collected Works, Moscow: Foreign Languages 
Publishing House, Volume 5, pp. 347-530.  
Milchman Alan; Rosenberg Alan (2002) “Marxism and Governmentality 
Studies: Toward a Critical Encounter” Rethinking Marxism, 14, (1): 
132-142. 
Milios, John (1999) “Cuba: A Question of Social Solidarity, Rethinking 
Marxism, 11(2): 97-100. 
Sakolsky, Ron (1992) “Disciplinary Power, the Labor Process, and the 
Constitution of the Laboring Subject” Rethinking Marxism, 5 (4).  
Tse-Tung, Mao (1961) On Guerrilla Warfare. Trans. Samuel B. Griffith II. 
Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.  
______________ (2001) Protracted War. Honolulu: University Press of the 
Pacific, 2001. 
 
                                                 
1
 The most prominent works read at that time, according to one of the participants, Marial Iglesias, were 
Archeology of Knowledge, Discipline and Punish, the History of Sexuality, and a bit later, the compilation 
of articles called Microphysics of Power. In 1993 the Argentinean professor Susana Paponi gave a course in 
the School of Philosophy and History of the University of Havana entitled "Foucault and Postmodernism," 
which contributed, according to Iglesias, to intensify the debate around his work inside Cuba. Finally she 
mentions that the inclusion of Foucault in the program of contemporary philosophy was due to the interest 
of Professor Paul Ravelo, a participant in the conference and a collaborator in Inicios de Partida. In the 
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area of history, however, Foucault is absent, with students graduating without having read his work or only 
at the margins of the institution. According to Iglesias, there are only a handful of works in Cuba that 
maintain a relation with Foucault's methodology. One is by Adrian Lopez on the cholera in XIX-century 
Cuba.” Other young researchers mentioned by Iglesias that have been influenced in some degree by the 
work of Foucault are Ricardo Quizá, Manuel Barcia, and Pablo Riaño (Inicios de Partida 2000: 36-37). 
2
 It is important to underline, however, that Acanda and other Cuban scholars assert that Gramsci 
understood that while power is in all places, it is not in the same shape or quantity, in contrast to Foucault 
who considered power unquantifiable. Acanda relies here on Poulantzas, who stated that “the reformulation 
of the concept of power in a relational sense only acquires its full meaning when we understand those 
relations as class relations.” In other words, Poulantzas and the Cuban scholars argue that Gramsci 
understood better than Foucault the fact that not all individuals incorporate power in the same manner 
and/or the same quantity (Inicios de Partida 2000: 107-109). 
